Are we headed toward a new Palestinian Nakba more horrific than the first? Are we standing before a new chapter in the long and bitter conflict when Yahya Sinwar replaces Yasser Arafat and Hamas replaces Fatah?
Is Hamas banking on claiming the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people, and impose its positions and choices on the Palestine Liberation Organization? Was the attack on Oct. 7 all along aimed at putting an end to the Oslo Accords, and Palestinian and Arab normalization efforts? Hamas has raised many questions by naming Sinwar as its new politburo leader as the region awaits the Iranian and Hezbollah responses. It often happens that a man takes a difficult choice that leaves its mark on his people and region.
Sinwar was 6 years old when a freedom fighter named Yasser Arafat changed the course of the Palestinian resistance and turned it into a regional priority. It was March 1968. The Israeli government decided it would discipline the fighters who were infiltrating from Jordan and carrying out attacks. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan thought it would be a cakewalk, especially in the wake of the defeat of Arab armies a year earlier.
Jordanian intelligence received word that Israeli forces were preparing to carry out an incursion into the village of Al-Karameh. Jordanian Lt. Gen. Mashour Haditha Al-Jazy relayed the information to the leaders of Palestinian organizations in the country, including Arafat. It was highly unlikely that the organizations, with their inferior weapons, could repel the incursion. The logical solution would be the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters from Al-Karameh to avoid losses.
Arafat, however, chose to take the risky option. His political prowess helped him realize that the Palestinian revolution needed a baptism of fire to impose its legitimacy. So, he decided to keep the forces in Al-Karameh. On March 21, Israel made landings on the surrounding hills. Dayan would have almost achieved his goal had Jordanian artillery not intervened and inflicted losses on his troops and machinery. Eighteen hours later, Israel called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of forces.
I recall what the Palestinian political leader Ahmed Jibril once told me. He said that he bluntly informed Arafat that the battle was a lost cause. Arafat, however, refused to withdraw and his choice led to the death of nearly a 100 fighters. Arafat described the battle as epic, added Jibril.
The Al-Karameh battle roused the Arab street. Thousands volunteered to join Fatah, and the movement was showered with aid. Arafat had taken a costly decision, but he succeeded in creating a landmark moment for the Palestinians. The battle opened the door to former Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, who took Arafat with him to the Soviet Union. Arafat would become one of the region’s prominent figures.
In the beginning, Arafat shared the same dream that Sinwar now has: Restoring every inch of Palestinian land. However, the statements Arafat heard in Moscow, Cairo, and several capitals, and the many long battles and numerous sacrifices, made him realize that Palestinians needed to face the truth and balance of power. So, the dream of a Palestinian state existing side by side with Israel came into being.
Has Sinwar found his own epic battle in the Oct. 7 attack? Was the operation originally aimed at forcing a prisoner swap with Israel, or sparking a war that would take the conflict back to its roots and beginnings?
In 2011, Hamas agreed to release an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, after holding him captive for five years. The ensuing prisoner exchange with Israel led to the release of 1,027 Palestinians, one of whom was Sinwar.
The obvious question now is: Why didn’t Sinwar plan to kidnap a handful of Israeli soldiers to force the Netanyahu government to release thousands of Palestinian prisoners? The abduction of one or more Israeli soldiers would not have given the Israeli leader the opportunity to launch a destructive war that has led to the deaths of almost 40,000 people in Gaza. Did Sinwar not realize the attack would certainly lead to war, or was he seeking a major shakeup regardless of the consequences?
Was he hoping the shakeup would lead to a rapid intifada in the West Bank that would eliminate what remains of the Palestinian Authority that was born out of the Oslo Accords? Did he believe the shakeup would rapidly lead to a broad war on the Lebanese front that would demand Iranian intervention?
Did he believe that it would hasten the launch of the “major blow” — the raining down of rockets on Israel from several countries, including Iran? Was the attack aimed at sparking a long war of attrition with the help of the allies in the “Resistance Axis”? Is concern about this war leading Netanyahu to threaten a regional war in order to impose a ceasefire on all fronts after the destruction of Gaza, the Palestinian part of the axis?
In Arafat, the politician had taken precedence over the general. It is evident that in Sinwar, the general takes precedence over the politician. Moreover, the Oct. 7 attack took place in a world that is vastly different from the one in which the Al-Karameh battle was waged. US destroyers are on alert to repel any attack on Israel. Iran does not want a regional war. How will the Hamas general back down from the war knowing that a ceasefire can sometimes be more painful than firing the first shot?
Ghassan Charbel is editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. X: @GhasanCharbel
Source: Arab News
