Power shifting is a fact of the international system; horizontally it shifted from Greeks to Romans to Persians to Ottomans to the Europeans (Anglo-American). It shifted vertically; from Nationalization to Regionalization to Internationalization to Globalization. Then geographically it is shifting from North to South, from West to East. In the geopolitical configuration, till the beginning of the 20th century, we experienced a unipolar world led by the United Kingdom. After the Second World War geopolitics was dominated by bipolar world. With the dismemberment of the USSR, we saw again a unipolar world. Arguably after 2003, the fluid multipolar world is gradually taking understandable shape. So, power shifting is a dynamic process, in the international system. As a student of ‘Structural Realism’ theoretically speaking, the modern global arrangement to a great extent is responsible for power competition and shifting of power. Hence, the structure of the international system, and the architecture of the international system largely explain how the states behave on a day-to-day basis in this arrangement. The order is anarchic, there is no higher authority to whom one can fall back, if in trouble. Thus there is a natural tendency to engage in security competition and acquire power because in that situation others are not capable of hurting. So, in this disordered arrangement, there is conflict, competition, cooperation, alliances, as well as opportunity (those who can exploit).
In the current multipolar fluid situation, we are observing geopolitical and geo-economics containment and counter-containment measures between peer competitors. As US-led unipolarity has been challenged by China, in the process of containment strategy formation of Quad, AUKUS, and building US-led over 180 military bases in the East and South China Sea primarily to contain China. In addition, G-7 with its vision to “Bring together world advanced economics to influence global trends and tackle pervasive and crosscutting issues and global crisis” put China at bay. As a countermeasure, China has come up with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) formation and expansion of BRICS, New Development Bank, and De-dollarization to break free. In regional space, China has evolved with the ‘String of Pearls Strategy’ to secure its sea line of communication. The other regional heavyweight India, as a response has come up with ‘Necklace of Diamond Strategy’ to protect her interest in oceans. So, what we are experiencing these are not rivalry but great power relationships in the anarchical international system. Power asymmetry is a fact of the international system however, the hegemon has the option either to cooperate or choose to conflict hence, there is a natural security competition and the Indian Ocean Region is no exception.
The USA and the West ignored the Indian Ocean for their Atlantic and Pacific orientation. It was influenced by World Wars, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Communist China, Korea and Cold War. Nonetheless, no ocean needs strategic stability more than the Indian Ocean. It is surrounded by 37 countries having 1/3 of the world's population. This is the demographic and strategic hub of the 21st century. The Indian Ocean houses important chock points like Bab El Mandeb; recently the ‘Houthis of Yemen’ has proved its significance by almost paralyzing the sea line of commerce between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.
The strait of Hormuz and Malacca are equally important. It is said, “Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of the world” and “If the world is an egg, Hormuz is the yoke.”
Indian Ocean is an idea where centrality is Islam spreading from Somalia to Indonesia. This has a civilizational connotation where energy politics and world navies jockeying for domination. This ocean accounts for ½ of world container traffic and 70% of petroleum products.
The presence of China and India near Hormuz and Bab El Mandeb will be expanding along with the US. Indian Ocean rivalry between the US and China in the Pacific interlocks with the regional rivalry between India and China. In addition, China has a Malacca dilemma, the old fear that the Ming-China world was disrupted by the Portuguese in 1511. In that conflict between the Sultan of Malacca and Admiral Afonso de Albuquerque of Portuguese, China supported the Sultan of Malacca, and ultimately Portuguese defeated the Malaccan Forces. This caused a telling blow to Chinese commerce through the Malacca Strait. China is more of a civilization than of a nation and civilization will always trace back to history. So, in case of strategic issues China shall likely remain engaged with all parties to avoid repetition of the same sufferings. Finally, the Indian Ocean will be where global power dynamics will be revealed, together with the contiguous Near East and energy-rich Central Asia.
The littorals of the Indian Ocean fall within the ‘Rim Land’ that has immense geopolitical significance. Around this ‘Rim Land’ the first great game unfolded about 400 BC between Greeks and Persians and the second great game was between Arabs and Chinese around 750 AD. However, the third great game or new great game in geopolitics between East and West is likely going to be in the Indian Ocean Region.
India Factor: India is the 3rd largest oil consumer after the US and China, she is expanding in the Indian Ocean Region horizontally from peninsular India to the East with her look East and act East policy.
The Kaladan project, the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway project, also the right to use naval bases in the East like in Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan. In the West relations with Gulf Cooperation Council, relations with Iran, and recovering Iraq are worth mentioning. There is a deal with Iran that it will supply 7.5 million tons of liquefied Natural Gas to India annually for 25 years. Iran may be a strategic rear base of India, like Afghanistan against Pakistan. India helping Iran to develop Chabahar Port in the Arabian Sea encouraging a road link from the port to Afghanistan. India has economic and cultural ties with both Persian and Arabian Shores. Iran also appeals to India as a viable transit state for Central Asian energy. Also being a member of the Quad challenged China’s dominance in the Indian Ocean.
China Factor: Deng Xiaoping's guidance of peaceful rising; hiding capacities, biding time and remaining free from ambition’s days are over. China very well remembers what the big powers of Europe, Japan, and the US did to her, between 1850-1950. So, China to maintain its growth would like to remain as powerful as possible in Asia. Hence, there is a shift from Deng Xiaoping’s guidance to the China Dream, a powerful China in Asia and a leading power in the world. More than 85% of China-bound oil passes through Malacca and the precarious East and South China Sea where she is being contained by a huge number of military bases by the US and her allies as mentioned earlier. In case of crisis, China will be energy-starved. China’s ’Centre of Gravity’ is her energy security so to break free from this stranglehold in the East and South China Sea, China devised BRI in 2013.
The idea is to make the West’s containment strategy irrelevant. Through BRI, China is expanding vertically South into the Indian Ocean through pivot countries like Myanmar and Pakistan by building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. China has also struck a deal with Iran for about 400 billion dollars in 2021 to improve its communication system connecting ports to Afghanistan. Recently China has become a development partner to Afghanistan. In the future, China will come up with another economic corridor to the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan and Iran. Both these countries suffered and still suffering in the hands of the US-led West, so there is a natural chemistry between them and China. To protect her sea line of communications China has developed several deep-sea ports along the Southern Eurasian ‘Rim Land’ for duel use (civil and military) in collaboration with host countries.
Looking back into history, Admiral Zheng He (15th century Ming Dynasty Explorer), his story says the Indian Sea was part of ‘China’s Saga’. China still follows the same main and secondary fleet routes of Zheng He. So, when China develops ports and communication infrastructure in Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia it replicates its past, incidentally ‘Ogaden Basin’ in Somalia, and Ethiopia has a huge gas reserve. China no longer accepts the Indian Ocean as the Ocean of the Indians. In addition, in recent times border incidents and skirmishes between India and China at Doklum 2017, Naku La 2021, at Galwan Valley in 2020-2021, and China claiming Arunachal as its territory maybe to irritate India, overload the decision-making cycle and increase its defense expenditure.
Bangladesh Perspectives
Bangladesh holds the key to the result of a long-dormant historical trade route between two rising giants of the 21st century. Earlier the importance and strategic significance of the Indian Ocean has been highlighted. This Ocean may be described as divided into two by peninsular India namely Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. In the apex of the Arabian Sea, Iran and Pakistan are located and volatility created in these countries explains their geopolitical significance. In the Bay of Bengal, the apex country is Bangladesh and to some extent Myanmar. In addition, Bangladesh's geographical location constitution India’s geostrategic limitation, the ‘Chicken Neck’.
The Doklum and Naku La incidents near the ‘Chicken Neck’ in 2017 and 2021 and very recently China's reemphasizing claim for Arunachal have made Bangladesh's geophysical location very sensitive. It may be connected that in June 2017, Doklum border tension was created by China near the ‘Chicken Neck’, and in August 2017, ‘Catastrophic Rohingya Ethnic Cleaning’ was conducted by Myanmar, the strategic partner of China.
Again in January 2021, Naku La border tension was created around the ‘Chicken Neck’ and Junta in Myanmar conducted a coup in February 2021. These may be co-incidence or maybe to keep the other regional power bogged down with internal dynamics.
Water sharing is now part of geopolitics, the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra River, the Tista River where two regional powers contesting and Bangladesh has been entangled especially on the Tista River issue (the proposed Chinese Tista project is near Indian geostrategic vulnerable ‘Chicken Neck’). She is walking on a tightrope. The USA has been pushing Dhaka for a long time for two defense deals, GSOMIA (security and information sharing agreement) and ACSA (logistic agreement). Dhaka was avoiding these possibly to maintain her balanced stance between China and the USA.
There are two geopolitical matrixes in the Bay of Bengal Region; the US-Bangladesh-India Triangle and the US-China-India-Bangladesh Quadrangle. In these relationships, there is harmony and disharmony, positive stability, and negative stability. For example, Bangladesh-India-US relationship geopolitically is in harmony and positive stability. In the case of India-China-US-Bangladesh relationship this is only partly in harmony and partly has negative stability. In this complex equation how a smaller country like Bangladesh would navigate in geopolitical murky water is a million-dollar question.
Should she balance or bandwagon? Both have positive and negative consequences. Dhaka has chosen to balance, it talks about the inclusive Bay of Bengal and it is a member of both the Indo-Pacific Alliance and BRI.
However, in Bangladesh neighborhood, Myanmar hill tribes are now part of new geopolitics. It’s bordered by both India and China with abundant resources. Chittagong Hill Tracks is not far away. It is likely to be sucked into such a geopolitical vortex. Both regional powers want Myanmar as a Vassal State. Bangladesh is a buffer to China’s energy corridor (Myanmar –China gas and oil pipelines). India’s anxiousness of ‘Maldives Syndrome’ is understandable, if Dhaka is leaning to Beijing. China needs stability in Myanmar for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as such maintains a balanced relationship with all parties in Myanmar's volatile internal turmoil. The USA is also engaged with the National Unity Government (Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD-led) and 3KC (Kayin, Kayah, Kachin, and Chin State; they have a considerable Christian population and Western Missionaries are active there). It has promulgated the Burma Act where if the US president feels, military means can also be applied. The Rohingya Act is around the corner. All these substantiate US interest in the neighborhood further complicating the geopolitical landscape. Under these prevailing circumstances, the Rohingya issue is no longer humanitarian or bilateral. It is more of a geopolitical issue now, meaning repatriation likely to be in limbo.
Robert D. Caplan in his book ‘The Monsoon’ writes about Myanmar “China India and other Asian nations jockeying for position with one of world’s worst, weirdest, wealthiest and most strategically placed rogue regimes”. In the Rohingya crisis both regional powers including Russia who are considered our strategic/development partners sided with Myanmar. Where did we go wrong? Do we need to revisit our policy? Dhaka needs to address these questions. Meanwhile, India horizontally and China vertically expanding into the Indian Ocean Region, this is the movement of ‘Regional Geopolitical Tectonic Plates’ in two different directions causing tremors, smaller countries like Bangladesh need to learn how to maneuver in this dicey environment.
Author Lt Gen (Retd) Mohammad Mahfuzur Rahman, PhD is the former Principal Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division , Prime Minister’s Office
He can be reached at mahfuzba2172@gmail.com
